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Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The
Trouble with Law-Based Conceptions of Ethics
STmvN R. SALBu*
INTRODUCTION
Ethics comprise the systems by which humans make moral decisions.'
The ethical basis of a particular decision may be a perceived universal truth,
a socially constructed system of values and priorities, a theoretically objective
analysis of good and bad effects, religious imperatives, inner promptings
that compel a highly personalized set of beliefs, or a combination of many
such factors. Generally, the ethical basis of a decision can be defined
externally, as a code of ethics which divides behaviors into categories of
acceptable and unacceptable, or it can be defined individually and person-
ally, perhaps influenced by, but not limited to, the intentional and explicit
reference to outside signals. 2
Businesses and professions commonly apply ethical codes in particular,
and external, legalistic sources of guidance in general, as they attempt to
encourage good behavior and improve the moral climate within their or-
ganizations, fields, industries, and professions. 3 Lawyers have their code of
* Assistant Professor, University of Texas at Austin. B.A., Hofstra University; M.A.,
Dartmouth College; J.D., The College of William and Mary; M.A., Ph.D., The Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania.
1. The behavioral school of decision theory has begun to recognize the variety of ways
in which decisions are made. Whereas economic models have traditionally assumed that the
behavior of humans is both intentionally and manifestly rational, critics like Herbert Simon
have observed disparity of rationality even among intendedly rational decision makers. Simon
observes that rationality is bounded by practical and cognitive limitations, so that the intent
to make optimal decisions is limited by the tendency to satisfice, or choose the first acceptable
alternative found. HmBERT A. SI1oN, AD mIisTRATrvE BEB[AVIOR 79-109 (3d ed. 1976).
2. The bifurcation of externally and internally based ethical models is a necessary simpli-
fication into ideal types, and is not intended to reflect the hybrid nature of virtually all
deciions. In other words, even the most calculatedly internal ethical decision mechanism must
be affected by external cues and values in a social world. The models examined in this Article
are therefore broadly classified as external versus internal to reflect an idealized emphasis or
approach rather than actualization. The distinction remains extremely important, as idealized
models affect the nature of the decisions one makes. Much of this Article focuses on identifying
differences in the quality of ethical decision making under intendedly external and intendedly
internal approaches.
3. For an informative discussion of the history of the development of codes of ethics,
see Jeanne F. Backof & Charles L. Martin, Jr., Historical Perspectives: Development of the
Codes of Ethics in the Legal, Medical and Accounting Professions, 10 J. Bus. ETmcs 99
(1991).
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professional ethics 4 and law students are required to prove their familiarity
with this code both in their studies and in their bar examination perform-
ance. Similar professional codes exist in medicine 5 and accounting. 6 Likewise,
many corporations have adopted codes of ethics as they attempt to eradicate
unethical behavior directly, and to encourage the moral development of
community members indirectly. 7
While this Article does not specifically critique codes of ethics, such codes
do serve as the most salient example of the confusion and misapprehension
inherent in the nature of legal instruments as congealed ethical theory.'
Codes of ethics provide a sadly diluted notion of what ethics entails, how
ethical decisions are made, and the nature and degree of individual respon-
sibility involved in the process of examining one's choices. Part I briefly
addresses the case of the code of ethics to illustrate this basic point. Part
II examines six dualities of ethical theory, suggesting that there is a legalistic
choice and a non-legalistic choice in each set, and arguing that only the
latter falls properly within the realm of ethics. Part III provides a theoretical
framework that ties the six broad dualities into one even larger model,
suggesting that the dualities can each be classified as a choice between
conformity theory and conflict theory, with consensus theory falling some-
4. See, e.g., TEXAS DISCIPImAY RULS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992). The rules cover
difficult areas of ethical decision making in the law, such as conflict of interest (Rules 1.06-
1.09), the treatment of confidential information and the scope of the lawyer-client privilege(Rule 1.05), advising clients as to economic matters regarding domestic relations law (Rule
1.04 cmt. 9), lawyer advertising (Rule 7.01), and even law firm letterheads (Rule 7.04). To the
extent that the rules encompass values held across the profession, they are valid rules of
conduct but must be recognized to fall short of the realm of ethics. The labelling of disciplinary
rules as professional rather than ethical (beginning in 1969), and the trend among law schools
to name courses "Professional Responsibility" rather than "Professional Ethics," reflect an
improvement among lawyers in distinguishing between mandatory codes of behavior and the
sphere of ethics.
5. E.g., CotmcIL ON ETHacAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRs OF THE ANERICAN MEDICAL Associ-
ATION, CURRENT OPINIONS ix, 42-49 (1986) (an adjunct to the revised Principles of Medical
Ethics adopted at the Annual Convention of the American Medical Association in 1980)
(Stating at vi: "[I]n all instances, it is the conglomerate intent and influence of the Principles
of Medical Ethics which shall measure ethical behavior for the physician.").
6. E.g., AmERiCAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC AccoUmTArs, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (1988); see also STEVEN M. MINT-, CASES N ACcoUNTm ETmcs AND PROFESSION-
ALIsm 1, 5 (2d ed. 1992). Mintz observes, "[t]he code of ethics that exists today is a codification
of standards, rulings, and interpretations of rules of conduct published by the Institute over
many years." Id. at 1. He describes the Code as consisting of principles and rules, noting
that "[t]he principles are goal-oriented and provide the framework for the profession's technical
standards and ethics rules. The principles prescribe ethical responsibilities members should
strive to achieve ....." Id. at 5.
7. See Cindy Skrzycki, More Firms Trying to Instill Ethical Values, WASH. POST, May
21, 1989, at H3.
8. For example, Alasdar MacIntyre states, "a virtue is now generally understood as a
disposition or sentiment which will produce in us obedience to certain rules .... " ALAsDAm
MACiNTYE, AFTER VIRTUE 244 (2d ed. 1984). The commingling and confusion of virtues and
rules is the source of law-based ethical positions which I contend are untenable.
[Vol. 68:101
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where between. These labels are defined in detail, culminating in the
proposition that only the conflict theories give meaning to the concept of
ethics.
I. THERE AmE No CODES OF Enmcs
The standards and rules established by businesses aid professions are
often labelled "codes of ethics" or "canons of professional responsibility."
Codes and canons can potentially serve a valuable function, providing
participants and members notice of the boundaries of acceptable behavior,
either within an organization or across organizations within a field.9 Partic-
ularized codes also institutionalize the expectations of the organizations that
adopt them, establishing efficient, consistent means of control.' 0 Rather
than apply idiosyncratic sanctions to individual instances of misbehavior,
systems of authority can employ codes to establish wide-sweeping control
that is largely self-administered by individuals, the majority of whom are
sufficiently socialized to abide by rules as long as they are clearly stated in
advance." So-called codes of ethics thereby create efficiencies in the en-
forcement of behavioral expectations through the effective process of so-
cialization.
However, one pays a price for what one labels codes of ethics or canons
of professional responsibility. Individual acts of conformity to rules and
regulations which result from effective socialization represent an agreement
between institution and conformer that the latter will suspend individual
judgment and replace its exercise with the application of the rules contained
in the code or canon. Whether one makes a good bargain in forfeiting this
judgment to gain increments of social efficiency and control is usually a
9. The role of rules, regulations, and standards within organizations is analyzed in great
detail in the organization theory literature in general, and in the theory of bureaucracy in
particular. See generally MAX WEBER, TnE THEORY OF SOciAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
(A.M. Henderson trans. & Talcott Parsons ed. & trans., The Free Press 3d ed. 1964) (1925).
10. Consistency is a virtue under the classical understanding of the law, in that clear notice
of the rules is given such that the administration of sanctions is fair and expected. The
foundations of due process are more appositely applied to law than to ethics, however, as
consistent and efficient expectations are only relevant to situations of enforcement. Whereas
it is important to give persons fair warning of minimal compliance standards under law, it is
not analogously important to provide notice of consistent standards of ethical behavior. When
an organization or profession seeks consistency of behavior in response to disputable ethical
questions, the imposition of expectations of uniformity is likely intended to benefit the entity,
rather than protect the individual.
11. Bureaucratic theory thus distinguishes among kinds of control. Simple control is
individual and idiosyncratic, applied case-by-case to reward or punish individuals, thereby
theoretically enhancing organizational effectiveness. Bureaucratic control consists of the rules,
regulations, and standards of an organization, and is effective because socialization processes
encourage conformity to such rules, regulations, and standards. For a detailed discussion of




question of degree. At the extremes, where all reasonable persons would
agree that Behavior A is wrong, little meaningful autonomy is sacrificed
for a comforting zone of security. Where there is widespread social consensus
regarding a particular ethical question, it is appropriate and fitting that the
disposition of the issue occur via incorporation into binding law. 2 One
should recognize that these relatively easy ethical questions are neither the
hard questions,13 nor the important ones, and in this sense they are questions
of law rather than compelling questions of ethics.' 4 At the margins, where
exercise of independent judgment would render divergent opinions, the
personal cost of coercion through the application of codes may be extremely
high.15
With its benefits and disadvantages duly noted, the crucial point is that
both the phrases "code of ethics" and "canon of professional responsibil-
ity" are disingenuous in their inaccurate connotation of individual choice.
A code is a law, and our codes of ethics establish particularized rules,
regulations, and standards that are legalistic in the rigidity of their appli-
cation. True ethics encompasses the recognition of an actual problem with
at least one social value component. It is a problem precisely because there
is an individual choice to be made among two or more options. Whereas
our legal reasoning is evoked to decide whether to abide by clear-cut rules
and regulations, our ethical reasoning is triggered only by questions that
lack an unambiguous response. So defined, the realms of law and ethics
are quite insular: the law can and should cover nonethical policy questions
and questions of value for which there is widespread social consensus.' 6
12. For example, there is widespread concurrence among reasonable persons that theft,
murder, and rape are ethically insupportable. This social agreement transcends virtually all
systemic religious and ethical boundaries. Therefore, the establishment of binding laws causes
little or no usurpation of individual freedom and responsibility in the exercise of personal
ethical judgment.
13. I borrow the concept of "hard cases" from Ronald Dworkin, who supports a relatively
broad use of interpretive discretion in their resolution. See RONALD DwoRKiN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERiOUSLY 81-130 (1977).
14. Compelling questions of ethics are those that cannot be resolved by reference to
virtually universally held values and beliefs. The more controversial an ethical question, the
more difficult its resolution and the greater the danger created by authoritative imposition of
a definitive mode of resolution. My objection in this Article to the legalistic conception of
ethics is aimed at the compelling questions for which there is no unambiguous response.
15. For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of professional codes of ethics, see Roger
Hauptman and Fred Hill, Deride, Abide or Dissent: On the Ethics of Professional Conduct,
10 J. Bus. ETmIcs 37 (1991) ("[T]here is strong evidence that the ethical ethos that has given
American society its direction has been damaged; further, it has been the professed professionals
who have been the major contributors to the ethical decline.").
16. I do not suggest here that questions of value and questions of law are discrete or
without overlap. Clearly society needs laws against murder, and clearly the act of murdering
is a violation of the law as a manifestation of values rather than as a manifestation of public
policy. This discussion brings us to the question of which value-driven issues are appropriately
canonized into law. The answer I posit is that only those questions of values for which there
[Vol. 68:101
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Questions of value not characterized by such consensus are the true ethical
questions. In deference to autonomy and responsibility, these decisions are
best focused through decentralization-removing them from the realm of
law, and placing them, in recognition of their ethical importance, squarely
on the shoulders of individuals.' 7
Confronted with a code, the individual has only one ethical choice: to
abide or not to abide. If an individual decides that civil disobedience to
laws and codes is permitted within his or her normative system, the code
becomes meaningless from an ethical standpoint because its effect is coercive
in nature and the individual has declined to be ruled by coercion.18 Similarly,
if the individual makes the overarching ethical decision to abide by all laws
and codes established by the groups in which he or she participates, the
ethical dimension of the code is lost as the individual simply follows the
rules that have been predetermined and that are externally applied without
individual cognitive recourse or evaluation. Canons of professional respon-
sibility face the same double bind: as canons they are compulsory, yet the
use of the phrase "responsibility" rather than "accountability" suggests,
inaccurately, that the canon is ethical rather than legal in nature.19
is widespread, nearly universal social consensus should become law. Within this framework,
murder should be unlawful because humans near and far, at least within our society, believe
it is wrong and should be outlawed. Abortion should not be unlawful because no such
consensus exists. Without widespread consensus, the degree of coercion regarding ethical issues
will be high. The less the consensus, that is, the closer a binary issue comes to a 50-50 split,
the greater the coercion and the less comfortable society is with the paternalistic, ostensibly
"correct" solution contained within the coercion. When uncontroversial ethical questions are
encoded within the law, few grounds for objection will arise and few persons will feel cheated
of their ethical autonomy. Only when controversial ethical questions are canonized is there an
estimable loss of freedom in this loftiest arena of ethical decision making. The canonization
of uncontroversial ethical questions should be accurately labelled as law, so as to avoid the
suggestion that the ethical questions have been addressed beforehand and need no longer be
considered. The canonization of controversial ethical questions is a usurpation of individual
autonomy, and therefore insupportable. Since the former type of canon encompasses the easy
questions, and the latter cannot be justified, there is no such thing as a code of ethics.
17. Central to this reasoning is the acceptance of a libertarian axiom-that important
decisions on which reasonable persons may differ should vest in the individual, and that
divestment of a compulsory system of controversial values enhances the humanity and dignity
of ethical decision making. For a discussion of the virtues of libertarian non-coerciveness, see
generally ROBERT NozIcK, A AtcnY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
18. For the classic statement on this topic, see HENRY D. THOREAU, Civil Disobedience,
in WALDEN AND Civ DISOBEDIENCE 383 (Penguin Books 1983) (1849). For a more current
ethical analysis of civil disobedience, see EDWARD H. MADDEN, CrvfL DISOBEDIENCE AND
MoRAL LAw IN NINETEENTH-CENTURy AmEmcAN PmOSOpHY (1968). The question of civil
disobedience is certainly an ethical one, and, as any classroom discussion on the topic will
verify, a controversial one. It is, however, a topic outside rather than within the question of
codes. The ethical decision is made before an individual enters the realm of the code. Therefore,
it confers no ethical dimension upon the code itself.
19. The distinction between the concepts of accountability and responsibility is an important
one. Accountability connotes the administration of sanctions in the event of failure to meet
an established set of standards. Responsibility implies the personal assessment of obligations
and the individual policing of one's effectiveness in meeting those obligations.
1992]
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The distinction is more than a semantic one for several reasons. Most
basically, a code of ethics will tend to undermine ethical evaluation. Mis-
labelling law as ethics suggests external preemption, or at least selection and
allocation, of the important ethical issues. This phenomenon facilitates an
individual's conclusion that abidance by the rules will foreclose the possi-
bility of ethical issues arising. A prefabricated, externally imposed code of
ethics, taken literally to be what it pretends to be, suggests that the ethical
issues have been addressed by the experts. The person who accepts the code
at face value replaces the honest and difficult confrontation of ethical
questions with a mindless conformity to the rules. The code ironically
reduces or eliminates the perception that ethical questions remain to be
solved, undermining the human potential to address specific moral problems
and to develop a general normative framework. 20
A code of ethics that is merely an inventory of rules for which there is
widespread, nearly uniform consensus is self-defeating. If such compulsory
canons were candidly -called laws, the field of ethics would be clearly
distinguished as manifestly the domain of the individual. A code of ethics
that is anything more than a list of basic rules that are widely supported
among its constituency is in itself immoral in its attempt to coerce conformity
in areas in which reasonable minds can and do differ. Externally imposed
value judgments in areas of highly charged controversy are at best pater-
nalistic in their insistence that intelligent adults adopt the parental party
line among several reasonable alternatives. At worst, they are dehumanizing
and degrading. Ethical codes that address hard cases supplant good faith
ethical appraisals with prefabricated ones. The mandatory substitution of
corporate for individual assessment among difficult ethical choices is a
personal assault at the most fundamental human level-the freedom and
ability to make evaluations. As codes of ethics that address real ethical
issues eliminate private evaluation of the most fundamentally important
questions, they debase and demean their constituencies.
These generic observations are essential to all that follows. Legalistic
manifestations of ethics are contained in many highly developed intellectual
models. Analysis based on natural law, objectivity, deism, collectivism, and
positivism share one fundamental flaw: they embrace a legalistic conception
of ethics. Their conceptual opposites-relativism, subjectivity, existentialism,
individualism, and realism-are superior in their rejection of legalistic
models of ethics. 2'
20. For a more detailed discussion of the flaws of compulsory ethics, see Bruce Jennings,
The Regulation of Virtue: Cross-Currents in Professional Ethics, 10 J. Bus. ETmcs 561, 567
(1991). Jennings discusses the need to infuse "conversation" into the development of profes-
sional ethics. He refers to the codification of professional responsibility as the "judicial model"
and suggests replacing that model with "civil discourse" in the form of broader and more
widespread dialogue among professionals and other citizens.
21. The reader may observe here that I am recommending a libertarian model that
[Vol. 68:101
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II. THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THIS WAR IS WAGED
Normative questions of ethics have been the subject of analysis spanning
many disciplines. Political theory, philosophy, theology, economics, law,
and literature are only the most obvious ones. In the sub-parts that follow,
six sets of paradigmatic rivals are examined. They come from all the
disciplines forementioned, and some are interdisciplinary. In each case, there
is an externally oriented, legalistic choice, and an internally oriented, indi-
vidualistic choice.22 Regardless of the merits of the externally oriented
options, law-based approaches should be recognized as codes of law rather
than ethics. Only the internally oriented models are conducive to ethical
choice.
A. Natural Law Versus Relativism
Natural law theory2 rests on the proposition that Choice A is inherently
better than Choice B, under all circumstances and for all persons and
cultures.u The translation of natural law into a system of ethics requires
an acknowledgement that human beings can know that Choice A is superior
encompasses schools of thought not typically associated with libertarianism, schools such as
relativism, critical analysis, and textual deconstruction. Indeed, these schools are even viewed
as antithetical to libertarianism. Scholarship based on these models can be hostile to libertar-
ianism in that critical analysis often leads to a conclusion that a power structure has exploited
a victim, and this exploitation is conceived to be a by-product of rampant exercise of individual
freedom, unrestricted by enlightened social regulation, in the form of applied libertarianism.
Yet individualism conceived intellectually rather than as a political tool should support rather
than undermine critical approaches. An individual locus of moral control outside the realm of
law or legalistic codes supports the diversity of ethical assessments conceptually necessary to
maintain the freedom to contradict a moral majority. Political movements such as the drive
for free choice to obtain an abortion are a function of recognizing that reasonable minds may
differ, but also of respecting the rights of individuals to make controversial moral decisions
free from coercion.
22. While the dichotomies examined seem invariably to fall on this continuum of external
and internal choices, neither the external nor the internal set necessarily provides one harmo-
nious viewpoint. While areas of contention doubtlessly exist, among, for example, natural law
theory, deism, and positivism, they do share an external, legalistic orientation. The dichoto-
mization is therefore not meant to imply compatibility of the six models on either the external
or the internal side, but rather simply to observe the tendency of such models to take one of
two basic approaches.
23. For a good discussion of the issues raised by natural law theory, see H.L.A. Hart,
Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 Pm.. REv. 175 (1955).
24. See Jom LocKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government, in SociAL CONTRACT 4 (Oxford University Press 1960) (1947) (stating that all
persons are naturally in "a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of
their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature")
(emphasis added). Locke identifies the bounds of natural law in the form of specific rules and
principles. For example, Locke contends that man "has not liberty to destroy himself,"
suggesting that suicide violates a natural moral edict. Id. at 6.
1992]
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to Choice B.2 The ostensibly universal character of superior choices under
natural law provides the justification for those contending to understand
its valuation priorities to try to impose those priorities universally. 26 Ethical
systems based on natural law tend in this way to become coercive, and the
belief that morality is absolute renders a legalistic form of ethical reasoning. 27
David Hume, while recognizing the relativity of values,2 ultimately insists
that unambiguously correct standards can be articulated, resulting in an
incontestable natural quality ordering of choices. 29 Hume suggests that there
exists a "natural standard" by which both aesthetic and moral superiority
and inferiority of value can be objectively derived.30 Under the natural
standard, rules exist which can reconcile divergent sentiments, elevating the
natural over the merely personally or culturally preferred.
Likewise, Kant's notion of the categorical imperative connotes a univer-
sality of moral mandate that transcends ephemeral differences in culture. 31
25. See id. at 5. "The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every
one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it," id., which
suggests that human reason is capable of discerning natural laws of right and wrong.
26. In their efforts to understand and apply universal truths and ethical norms, natural
law theorists often find themselves in conflict with those espousing multicultural tolerance of
divergent values. Natural law, a product of the Enlightenment in Europe, is an essentially
Western phenomenon which critics of multiculturalism contend is central to a superior,
classically liberal normative system. For a detailed discussion of the limitations of multicultural
value perspectives, see ARTHUR M. SCmHIsNoER, THE DisurrING OF AMERICA (W.W. Norton
& Co., 1992) (1991).
27. This is the reason that politically nonconservative citizens and members of U.S. Senate
committees might worry about the natural law stances of Supreme Court nominees. The fear
is that the nominee will: (a) believe that universal truths exist, (b) believe that he or she knows
the nature of those universal truths, and (c) impose those universal truths upon his or her
constitutional interpretation. In this manner, right-to-life proponents believe that they under-
stand the natural edicts of a supreme being, and that it is appropriate to insist that all abide
by such universal law.
28. See DAVID HUrME, Of The Standard of Taste, in FoUR DISSERTATONS (1757), reprinted
in OF Tan STANDARD OF TASTE AND OTER ESSAYS 3, 3 (John W. Lenz ed., 1965). Hume
states that:
[t]he great variety of Taste, as well as of opinion, which prevails in the world,
is too obvious not to have fallen under every one's observation.... We are apt
to call barbarous whatever departs widely from our taste and apprehension; but
soon find the epithet of reproach retorted upon us. And the highest arrogance
and self-conceit is at last startled, on observing an equal assurance on all sides,
and scruples, amidst such a contest of sentiment, to pronounce positively in its
own favor.
Id. (emphasis in original).
29. See id. at 7. Despite his initial insistence that values are variable, Hume ultimately
contends that inferior pronouncements of value are "absurd and ridiculous."
30. Id.
31. See generally IMMANUEL KAr, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, in- EnucAL
PmosoPHY (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1983) (1785). The categorical
imperative is Kant's source of moral principles. A moral principle should obtain under the




Kant contends that "[c]ognitions and judgments must ... admit of universal
communicability; for otherwise ... they would be collectively a mere
subjective play of the representative powers." '3 2 Grounded in the deontolog-
ical concept of ethics by virtue of duty, the categorical imperative is
compatible with natural law theory. Likewise implicit in the social func-
tioning of the categorical imperative is an underlying belief that it is possible
to achieve popular consensus regarding universal truths, transforming a
theoretical ideal into a viable moral system.33
Moral relativism is a denial of normative natural laws, and consists of
the idea that ethics are a function of the cultural contexts within which
they operate. 34 Relativism is built on anthropological axioms, including the
belief that (a) application of foreign norms to the relevant culture comprises
ethnocentric behavior, which can only result in misunderstanding the culture,
and the arbitrary imposition of paternalistic or imperialistic rules; 35 and (b)
very little behavior has been observed to be universal across all cultures
studied, supporting the notion that what appears within the purview of one
culture to be aberrant of nature is in reality only an unfamiliar, therefore
discomforting, alternative of equal plausibility and value.3 6 From a relativist
standpoint, law must be separated from ethics because law embodies en-
forcement (which may or may not be driven by someone's moral determi-
nation, but very rarely self-determination), while ethics is a function of
32. IMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE oF JuDamENT, § 21 (J. H. Bernard trans., Hafner Publishing
Co. 1951) (1790).
33. A process for deriving ethics from a collection of values recommended for universal
application is most likely to function when its fundamental assumption-universality-is
achieved. While Kantian ethics technically require universality only as an assumption applied
as a benchmark for establishing a set of categorical imperatives, natural law theory easily
extends the assumption from formulation to implementation, thereby creating a coercive setting.
34. See TOM L. BECucHA~m & NoRMAN E. BoWvE, ETHICAL THEORY AND BusINss 11 (3d
ed. 1988). The authors note that supporters of relativist viewpoints observe that:
moral rightness and wrongness vary from place to place and that there are no
absolute or universal moral standards that have applied to all persons at all
times. [Since] the concept of rightness depends on individual or cultural beliefs
... rightness and wrongness are therefore meaningless notions if isolated from
the specific contexts in which they have arisen.
Id.
35. For a discussion of cultural relativity from social and anthropological disciplines, see
ERNET BEcKER, THE BrTH AN DATH OF MEANiNG 112-54 (2d ed. 1971). Becker notes that:
Two centuries of modem anthropological work have accumulated a careful and
detailed record of [the] natural genius of man: anthropologists found that there
were any number of different patterns in which individuals could act, and in
each pattern they possessed a sense of primary value in a world of meaning.
Id. at 112. Anthropological study suggests that both value and meaning are culturally contin-
gent, rather than absolute.
36. Id. at 130. (observing that "for almost every timeless truth that one thought dear to
the human heart, the anthropologist [can] name a tribe or a people who did not hold that
truth dear-who may even have scorned it").
1992]
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individual choices made within an inevitable and unavoidable social and
cultural context.37
The inability of natural law theories to convince us either that there is
one truth or that we can know that truth is, respectively, its ontological38
and its epistemologicaP9 failure. In this vein, Richard DeGeorge suggests
that moral issues concerning whether to apply American laws in transna-
tional settings are "false dilemmas" in that they confuse regulatory edict
and morality.40 Regulations 4' can be created for policy reasons or for moral
reasons, the former being by definition value-neutral and the latter reflecting,
in a democracy, only the values of the enacting or promulgating majority.
In either case, regulatory edict remains edict, reflecting only coincidentally,
and only sometimes, the morally developed position of any individual
operating under its jurisdiction or sphere of influence.42
B. Classical Versus Neoclassical Approaches
The discussion of normative systems as classical or neoclassical has
developed in the area of contract law, and as such is more directly a product
of jurisprudence than of ethics.43 Yet the distinction is relevant to the
discussion of legalistic models of ethics because the contract law from which
it arises forms a middle ground between the coercive nature of law and the
conditions of conflict in which real ethical decisions are made. Contracts
37. William M. Evan makes this distinction nicely, stating, "[firom a sociological rather
than a jurisprudential point of view, law is a body of norms with institutionalized methods
of enforcement and justice is a set of cultural values justifying them." William M. Evan,
Value Conflicts in the Law of Evidence, 4 AM. BmIAv. Sci. 23, 24 (1960). The relativist might
finish the comparison by observing that ethics is the set of individual choices made within the
context of laws and cultural values.
38. Ontology concerns the state of being. WEBsmR's THmD NEW INTERNATioNAL DicnoN-
ARY 1576 (1986).
39. Epistemology concerns the act of knowing. Id. at 764.
40. Richard DeGeorge, Ethical Dilemmas for Multinational Enterprise: A Philosophical
Overview, in W. Hoismuw Er AL., ETrucs AND Tm MuLTiNA-TONAL ENTERPRIsE (1986).
41. I use the term "regulation" synonymously with the word "law," for they share the
characteristic of imposition by force which is relevant to this discussion.
42. One might be tempted to argue that, in a democracy, regulations based on moral
stances are constructively the ethical positions of the citizens who elected the enacting legislators.
The fallacy of such a response rests upon the confusion between participation in a democratic
system, which invariably includes the concession of some individual beliefs and values under
a pragmatic social contract, and ethics, which concerns the application of values under whatever
conditions of free choice remain outside the scope of the social contract. The mere fact of
participation in a social contract cannot, therefore, be construed as the equivalent of ethical
approval of all compromises developed under that contract. The poignancy of the social
contract rests, after all, in the act of forfeiting a degree of individual freedom for an increment
of social order. Ethics is the province of freedom, while law is the dominion of order.
43. For a discussion of the characteristics of classical and neoclassical approaches, see Ian
R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neo-
classical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978).
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between individuals" can be viewed as the creation of concessions that alter
existing rights patterns within and under the law. Contracts may be firmly
bounded by unalterable law,45 or may allow the creation of idiosyncratic
exceptions to lawfully created rebuttable rights and duties, which act effec-
tively to create a default set of rules in the event that the parties fail to
create their own. 46 Because contract law creates the ability to mold inter-
personal relations and to create or destroy obligations otherwise enforced
by edict of law, it is a legal mechanism that is by its nature a hybrid or
cognate of ethics as well.47 This special character of contract law can be
traced on a continuum of ethical conception from pure coercion (law without
the contractual option) to pure freedom (ethics without the exercise of
contract, the pure resolution of conflicting postulates). Between the two
would be all the varieties of contract, with their inherent basis in mutual
concession, allowing resolution of ethical conflict within the coercive limits
of the law.
While the coercive nature of law and the conflict-based essence of ethics
are discussed in detail in Part IV, it is important to observe for our purposes
44. I refer to contracts between individuals here, as opposed to the social contract, which
in this context is more closely aligned with the law, as a crucial source of legitimizing coercion.
The distinction between micro-level contracts, such as those occurring between two parties,
and overarching social contracts is important. Micro-level contracts involve the exercise of
choice on a case-by-case basis in the relinquishment of existing rights in exchange for new
rights. As such, micro-level contracting is an essentially voluntary, noncoercive phenomenon,
despite its effect of future restriction in accordance with the agreement. In contrast, the social
contract binds all individuals who participate within the relevant society. Participation is only
voluntary beyond a certain minimum point, since humans are forced by nature and by proximity
into social interaction. To the degree that one is swept into society by unrelenting forces, the
norms established under the social contract can be coercive. Although it has been suggested
that social contracts are a significant source of ethical norms, the ethical component becomes
less robust as the norms derived from the social contract become more coercive. For a
discussion of social contract as a source of ethical norms, see Thomas W. Dunfee, Business
Ethics and Extant Social Contracts, I Bus. ETmCs Q. 23 (1991).
45. The laws which consider certain forms of contract to be against public policy fall
within this category. Contracts in restraint of competition, for example, are unenforceable,
regardless of the voluntary agreement of the parties. See, e.g., Slisz v. Munzenreider Corp.,
411 N.E.2d 700, 704-09 (Ind. App. 1980).
46. Contracts in this category create a new elective order which differs from the norm,
and applies particularly to the parties. The Uniform Partnership Act, which allows contractual
provisions within a partnership agreement but provides legal substance to relationships of
partners in absence of an agreement, is an example of this type of contracting realm. See,
e.g., UNn'. PARTNERsHiP ACT (U.P.A.), § 8(2) (1914) ("Unless the contrary intention appears,
property acquired with partnership funds is partnership property.") The law establishes a
presumptive assessment of rights under a particular condition, which may be altered by the
consensual intent of both parties.
47. But see EIans DuRcEim, ON MoRALITY AND Socmry: SECTED Wam~rnos 88 (Robert
N. Beliah ed., 1973). Durkheim observes that the social contract is of limited value in
establishing a truly consensual and therefore noncoercive form of ethics. This is so, he
contends, because individuals who are born into a society already bound by a social contract
have limited choice in the formation of that contract. It is, as such, a contract of adhesion,
and therefore largely involuntary.
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here what I mean by these phrases. Law is viewed as essentially coercive to
reflect its omnipotence within its jurisdiction apart from individual assess-
ment, judgment, or development of alternative options. The law in its purest
form is applied uniformly and consistently, avoiding arbitrary or capricious
differentiation of application." Ethical decisions in their pristine essence are
purely voluntary and occur in the absence of coercive force, yet in the
presence of normative argument and discourse. As a product of forensic
interaction of conflicting viewpoints, the determination of ethical questions
is an individual process of conflict resolution within a free society and
marketplace of ideas. Contractual consideration is a form of concession or
compromise which, under conditions that suggest value conflict, create a
middle ground-still subject to the fiat of law, but with alterations and
adjustments that represent the bargaining process, the purchase and sale of
conflicting values and goals.
Within this context, classical contract embodies the most legalistic form
of agreement, while neoclassical contract favors the less legalistic, more
flexible form. While classically configured contract is a defensibly appro-
priate mode of law,49 it is too coercive to operate effectively as a mode of
ethics.
Classical approaches to contract law promote predictability and stability."
The philosophy behind classically fixed legal doctrine favors consistency of
application, regardless of the status or identity of the parties bound, to
yield fairness across cases and the security rendered by clear notice of
unambiguous rules. Classical application of the law can act as a tempering
influence upon its coercive nature, rendering compulsion less harsh through
either interpretive consistency or the very removal of interpretive possibili-
ties.5'
Gerald Wetlaufer describes classical reasoning as the denial of legal
discourse . 2 He observes in classical, legalistic reasoning the application of
48. Ian R. Macneil discusses the classical conception of contract law in terms of standard-
ization apart from the idiosyncrasies of the individual parties. Ian R. Macneil, The Many
Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. Rv. 691 (1974).
49. This is not to suggest that classical contract is always the optimum mode of law. For
a discussion of some of the considerations that must be weighed in this regard, see Steven R.
Salbu, Joint Venture Contracts as Strategic Tools, 25 IND. L. REv. 397 (1991).
50. Macneil discusses these characteristics in terms of "discreteness" and "presentiation."
Discreteness refers to the separate treatment of isolated transactions or contracting incidents.
Presentiation allows agreements for the future to fix at the time of contracting all rights,
duties, and remedies in the event of a breach. See Macneil, supra note 43, at 862.
51. In its purest form, classical contract supplants any necessity for legal interpretation.
The clear, unambiguous, and uncontested iteration of law under the purest classical model
leaves no room or need for explication or development over time. While this situation does
not exist in reality, it represents the classical ideal.
52. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REv. 1545(1990).
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binary judgment as well as the closure of controversy. 53 The law renders a
series of decisions favoring one party or the other, determining, positively
or negatively, whether elements of a cause of action exist, whether defenses
exist, whether the granting of motions is justified, and ultimately, who wins
and who loses. The invariable binary closure of controversy applies the
legally created truth-the appropriate answer to a question as it has devel-
oped under common or legislated law. Catherine Belsey likewise compares
classical versus interrogative conceptions of text, observing that the former
leads to closure upon a truth whereas the latter denies the existence of a
"single privileged discourse which contains and places all the others." 4
Neoclassical approaches encompass the erosion of a stable, rule-based
approach to the law. 5  Neoclassicism is fluid rather than rigid, adjusting to
changing assumptions and norms.56 It is less legalistic in its relinquishment
of the binary closure of controversy, and thereby more responsive to the
nature of bona fide moral, intellectual, and behavioral activity. Whereas
codified, institutionalized ethical systems mark the end of discourse, neo-
classical flexibility permits the exercise of choice within the context of
meaningful discussion. 7
The flexibility of neoclassicism is a function of the demystification of
contract. Whereas the classical idea of concurrence views the contract as an
idiosyncratic extension of legal rights, responsibilities, and obligations pe-
culiar to the parties in privity, neoclassical reasoning views contract as a
flexible commitment between two parties that can fall short of coercion.
More organic, natural neoclassical concepts include contingent rights and
duties, agreements to agree, and obligations the nature of which fluctuates
in accordance with changes in circumstances and contracting assumptions.
In this manner, neoclassicism replaces the classical notion of absolute
commitment of obligations with the sense that the nature of obligations
should be relative to external forces and conditions. The relativity of
neoclassical contract is a compromise between coercion and conflict which
favors the latter just as classical contract favored the former. From most
to least coercive, the table below represents conceptions of contract:
Law-Based Classical Neoclassical Conflict-Based
Decision Contract Contract Decision[I ]
Most Coercive Least Coercive
Contract occupies the moderate position between absolute compulsion
53. Id. at 1552.
54. CATsERIN BErs y, CaRnICAL PRACTICE 68, 92 (1980).
55. For a discussion of the nature of neoclassical formulations, see Macneil, supra note
43, at 865-86.
56. Id.
57. By "meaningful discussion," I refer to discourse that identifies ethical options and
permits one to choose any of the options under consideration.
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under the law and absolute freedom to resolve live conflicts within a dynamic
discourse. Norms of ethics as a function of contract can be more or less
classical or neoclassical, depending on the degree to which concession of
rights is held to eclipse individually maintained freedoms. The classical
nexus between contract and ethics suggests that norms arise from agreement.
Therefore, ethical behavior comprises the formulaic application of these
norms. While this is a viable contractual notion of ethics, it is ultimately
sterile because it inhibits discourse beyond the establishment of the con-
tractually created norms. The neoclassical formulation of contractual ethics
suggests that norms must sometimes be established, even to the extent of
creating coercive rules,.8 but that these norms constitute laws by definition
of coercion. The goal of ethical discourse should be the avoidance- of
classically confining contractual obligations, which by their very legalistic
nature foreclose the realm of individual, value-driven decision making. From
this standpoint, neoclassical contract formulations of ethics are self-immo-
lating, establishing gaps for individual assessment within necessary legal
boundaries. 9 Neoclassical contract attempts to bind less completely, and in
the breach leaves room for discussion, rumination, and deliberation. Op-
portunities for individual assessment permit the divergence of ethics from
the realm of enforced law to the loftier climate of the exercise of free will.
C. Deism Versus Existentialism
Deistic and existentialist models of ethics acknowledge the legitimacy of
fundamentally different sources of values. For the purposes of this Article,
I define deistic philosophies to include a wide array of belief systems founded
in some form of theology, including the existence of a divine or superior
being as the legitimate source of ethical rules and norms.60 I define an
existentialist philosophy as one which places responsibility upon the self
rather than another entity as the ultimate source of values.61
58. What I am labelling neoclassical contractual ethics recognizes the occasional need for
coerciveness of law, but favors the limitation of codification to instances of widespread,
virtually universal assent regarding the appropriate resolution of an ethical question.
59. To the extent that neoclassical consensus is self-immolating, it becomes relational in
character. A relational agreement is open to total alteration or revision in the event that
underlying assumptions and circumstances render change the best mechanism for optimizing
the substantive quality of the contract. For a discussion of the manner in which relational
conceptions of contract surpass neoclassicism in receptiveness to modification, see Robert E.
Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. Rav. 2005, 2030 (1987).
60. Deist religions encompass "a God who rule[s] through law, ... seen as the inexorable
and uniform law of nature." HERY F. MAY, TEE ENuoim'Nm= iN AmRmcA 122 (1976).
Deist and natural law theories, discussed infra Part III, are compatible.
61. Under this definition, I limit my analysis to atheistic or nontheistic philosophies.
Atheistic philosophies deny the existence of a higher being; nontheistic philosophies view the
existence of a higher being as irrelevant to the resolution of ethical problems and the
development of ethical systems. In contrast with deistic approaches, it is unimportant to
distinguish whether an existentialist philosophy denies the existence of a god or merely discounts
its significance in the realm of ethics.
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Religious formulations of ethics often include codes or laws, and under
the preceding definition I focus my analysis by labelling as deistic only
those systems which attempt to codify morality.62 Theological canonization
of morality characterizes many religious systems, Judeo-Christian law being
the most prevalent in and easily accessible to Western cultures. 63 Beyond
the bounds of identifiable Biblical laws, parables and object lessons provide
textual fodder for the development of ethical reasoning. Reader reaction to
sacred passages can and does run the gamut from identification of universal
laws to the recognition of a personally serving and personally biased
interpretation of laws and parables."
Deistic social systems that are rigid in their insistence on compliance with
centrally developed interpretations tend to be legalistic, mandating the
reading of actual theological rules literally and converting parables into
other rules.6 s This inflexible form of deistic ethics is also a degraded form
because the centralized source of interpretive authority seeks to and does
apply coercive measures to supplant the exercise of individual evaluative
capacity with prefabricated, nonnegotiable doctrine. Deistic models that
permit or encourage individual interpretation of text are far less coercive
than their fundamentalist cognates, and as the degree of receptivity to
interpretation increases, the degree of coerciveness regarding both canons
and parables is diminished. The least coercive interpretive stance is that
which views the relevant religious book as text rather than as moral
commandment. While the context of the text in such instances is undoubtedly
religious, the application is essentially existentialist because the reader is
charged with complete custody of the processes of evaluation and moral
judgment.
In this sense, existentialist perspectives do not necessarily discredit external
sources of normative reasoning; rather, they limit the sources to the role
of persuasion rather than force. The outcome of free persuasion in an open
marketplace of ideas, coupled with free choice in the adoption of behaviors,
comprise a dialectic necessary if what we term ethical activity is to be
62. Approaches that are theologically grounded but entirely devoid of moral codification
are rare, but to the extent that they might exist, they are a form of existentialism under my
definition. Since the deity under such systems provides no ethical code, the deity is discounted
from the ethical process, and we must conclude that it serves extra-ethical functions apart
from the canonization of morality.
63. E.g., Exodus 20:1-17 (God delivers the Ten Commandments to Moses); Deuteronomy
12:1-26:19 (the exposition of the law).
64. The phrases "personally serving" and "personally biased" here are not meant to be
especially derogatory. Rather, they refer to a belief that textuality is contingent and an
understanding that even good faith efforts to derive ethical values from texts is susceptible to
the interactive process by which reading invariably incorporates subjective interpretation.
65. For example, fundamentalist Christians may condemn homosexual behavior as objec-
tively immoral and cite parables or stories rather than commandments in defense of universal,
legalistic enforcement of their moral beliefs.
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imbued with a valuative aspect. Along these lines of reasoning, Hazel Barnes
observes that ethics has little to do with "conformity with God's judgment
or the opinions of other men." Rather, "[tihe choice to be ethical as such
involves the bare idea of the inner demand for justification as a self-imposed
necessary relation between actions and judgments by and within the same
individual." 67 Thus, models which demand compliance with an exoteric set
of standards cannot be construed as ethical models because they lack the
fundamental ethical components of personal judgment and assessment."
More explicitly, the divestment of individual responsibility for any deci-
sions taken is viewed by pure forms of existentialism as evincing bad faith,69
and therefore as fundamentally at odds with the conception of the ethical.
Authenticity is achieved through the acceptance of ultimate responsibility
for the creation of meaning in all aspects of life, but perhaps none more
crucial than the area of moral meaning.70 It is in this sense that Albert
Camus ties moral philosophy inextricably with what he calls "metaphysical
rebellion," conveying a sense that thoughtless conformity to sources of
ethical domination is in reality an abdication of the good faith search for
a morality.71 In the breach of good faith morality we are left with bare
compliance with law.7 2 The restoration of good faith, consisting of the
creation of fundamental individual evaluative responsibility, is the only
existentially authentic version of an ethics.
D. Behavioral versus Fulfillment Models of Psychology
Behavioral psychology abounds in the language of legalistic ethics. The
phrase "learning theory," with which behavioral theory is essentially syn-
onymous, 73 emphasizes that appropriate behavior is best determined by the
66. HAZEUL E. BAus, AN EXisTENTALIST ETmICS 9 (1967).
67. Id.
68. Along these lines, S6ren Kierkegaard contends that "truth is subjectivity." See S6ren
Kierkegaard, Truth is Subjectivity, in ExiSTENTIALaSM FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE 110-20
(Walter A. Kaufmann ed., 1990).
69. Jean Paul Sartre discusses bad faith in detail. For Sartre, bad faith consists of the
denial of responsible freedom of being. See JEAN PAUL SARTRE, BEIo AND NOTHINGNESS 86-
116 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1966).
70. See generally VIKTOR E. FBANKa, MAN'S SEACH FOR MEANING (1959).
71. See ALBERT CAMus, THE REBEL: AN ESSAY ON MAN IN REVOLT 24 (1956). Camus states,
"if the metaphysical rebel ranges himself against a power whose existence he simultaneously
affirms, he only admits the existence of this power at the very instant he calls it into question."
Id. at 24. Whether the power in question be a deity, a purportedly natural law, or an admittedly
man-made law, Camus' observation denotes a sense that the final process of evaluation occurs
individually rather than collectively, and the departure from the power of the law is an entry
into the dominion of the ethical.
72. Conversely, in the absence of an unimpeachable source of law, meaning can be provided
only by a self-determined morality, so that Camus observes, "[t]his universe without a master
seems ... neither sterile nor futile." ALBERT CA.us, THE MYTH OF SIsYIHuS 201 (1950).
73. D.E. Berlyne, Behavior Theory as Personality Theory, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY
THEORY AND RESEARCH 629 (Edgar F. Borgatto & William E. Lambert eds., 1968).
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application of correct responses to various situations, responses that are
taught by a relevant external authority. Proponents speak of the learning
process in terms of intervention, suggesting the application of an extrinsically
derived treatment, and of a concomitant performance and response, implying
that the intervention or treatment is evaluated based on conformity to the
predetermined goals of the outside source of authority.
Under the behavioral paradigm, learning occurs through the creation of
a stimulus-response bond which is strengthened by reinforcement. 74 Rein-
forcement using rewards valued by the individual increases the likelihood
that the rewarded operant behavior will be repeated in the future. The
source of authority who has control over the dispensation of rewards is
able to use them as an instrumentality for the engineering of behavior. If
the ends sought are labelled "socially acceptable or desirable behaviors,"
then the behavior modification program that increases the behaviors is
elevated to the status of an effective ethical system. 75
An ethical system derived from behavioralism cannot avoid being legalistic
because the external administration of rewards must come from a source
of authority. The social engineer does not provide a code of laws accom-
panied by legally administered sanctions. Rather, he establishes a code of
desired behaviors to be enforced by technically nonlegal but nonetheless
legalistic sanctions. These sanctions have an effect virtually identical to that
of the code of law. The source of externally administered rewards and
punishments makes little difference to the person who is their object.7 6
Thus, while a behavioralist system can increase the occurrence of socially
desirable behavior, it cannot do so without the use of ultimately legalistic
tools for encouraging compliance. Such a system should be called what it
truly is-a coercive body of laws imposed by whoever has the power and
authority to issue the sanctions involved. Because this system molds behavior
through the application of treatments to an object, it cannot seriously be
considered a system of ethics. An object is not accorded the respect and
autonomy necessary to make meaningful ethical decisions. It is not surprising
that Skinner's classic defense of behavioral psychology as a system of ethics
74. For a discussion of classic behavioralist theory of psychology applying these basic
precepts, see, for example, CxRK L. Hu-u, PRiNciPLEs OF BEHAVIOR (Richard M. Elliot ed.,
1943); Clark L. Hull, The Place of Innate Individual and Species Differences in a Natural
Science Theory of Behavior, 52 PsYcH. REv. 55 (1945); Kenneth W. Spence, The Postulates
and Methods of "Behaviorism," 55 PsYcH. REV. 67 (1948); B.F. Skinner, Are Theories of
Learning Necessary?, 57 PsYcH. REv. 193 (1950).
75. See B.F. SKINNER, WAN Two (1948) (using behavioral engineering to create a
fictional utopian society). Skinner suggests that psychological management through positive
reinforcement can result in more desirable behavior and, indirectly, a more ethically desirable
society.
76. Both laws legitimated by correct systematic promulgation and operant conditioning are
implemented by utilization of the force of a hierarchy of power. The dynamics of reward and
punishment under law and behavior modification are philosophically indistinguishable.
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justifies itself as being "beyond freedom and dignity."' ' Yet while codes of
law and methods of social engineering can dispense with freedom and
dignity, a system of ethics cannot.
Fulfillment models of psychology inhabit the territory diametric to the
behavioral approach just examined. Fulfillment models emphasize the de-
velopment of human potential, including moral development. In their efforts
toward self-actualization, humans strive to enhance the quality of their own
lives (which economists would describe as selfish indulgence of individual
utility preference functions) 7 and of others' lives (which efforts comprise
the ethical, paradoxically selfless aspect of self-actualization). 79 Carl Rogers
observes that the process of self-actualization requires a self-concept as well
as the need for positive self-regard.80 Unlike the behavioral models that
define success solely in terms of the incidence of desired actions, Rogers's
approach is predicated upon the continued, volitional growth of an inner
self."'
Abraham Maslow has identified a similar tendency toward self-actuali-
zation as the process of realizing inner human potential 2 Self-actualization
represents for Maslow the final, ultimate stage in human development, one
following a series of stages that represent physical and psychological sur-
vival. 83 Maslow's approach is similar to Rogers's in its assumption that the
highest level of human functioning, which is humanistic in its transcendence
beyond purely selfish and self-centered motives, can occur only upon a
foundation of trust and security in the self.84 A person's spiritual or altruistic
level of thoughts and actions is built on a solid belief that one's physical
safety is secure and that one's judgment is sound. The highest realm of
human action-if not the spiritual, then certainly the ethical-is inseparable
from the process of individual human development.
85
77. B.F. SKINNER, BEYoND FREEDOM AND DIGNTY (1971).
78. For a general discussion of utility preference functions in economic theory, see Wns
L. PETERSON, PRIuirn'c s OF EcoNo)Mcs: MIcRo 37-44 (6th ed., 1986).
79. See generally CARL ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON 347-401 (1961).
80. Carl Rogers, A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships, as
Developed in the Client-Centered Framework, in 3 PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY OF SCIENCE 185,
222-23 (Sigmund Koch ed., 1959).
81. Id.
82. Abraham Maslow, A Theory of Metamotivation: The Biological Rooting of the Value-
Life, 7 J. HuM. PsYcH. 93 (1967).
83. For a good discussion of these stages, see SAL AToRE R. MADDI, PERSONALrrY THEORIES:
A ComPARATrVE ANALYSIS 93-102 (3d ed. 1976).
84. See id. at 79-92.
85. At this level, psychologists are joined by political philosophers who cast an ethical veil
over the question of human fulfillment. Roberto Unger, for example, creates a categorical
imperative for individuals to respect one anothers' transcendent natures. See ROBERTO M.
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 191-235 (1975). Drucilla Cornell aptly suggests that Unger's
philosophy is "a powerful, passionate reminder that if we are locked in an iron cage, it is at
least in part a cage of our making." Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Tragedy and Complacency, 81
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The work of Lawrence Kohlberg clarifies the nexus between fulfillment
theories of psychology and developmental theories of morality. 6 In his
"stages of moral development," Kohlberg suggests that humans evince
varying levels of moral maturity. Furthermore, these levels are a function
of the sources to which they attribute the moral nature of action." During
the preconventional stage of moral maturity, the moral nature of behavior
is a function of the individual's experience with rewards and punishments.
Preconventional morality formulates concepts of right and wrong based on
externally induced consequences. Similarly, behavioral intervention seeks to
eradicate undesirable behavior and elicit desirable behavior through the
process of operant reinforcement."a The behavioral approach to a moral
world is thus aptly regarded, from the standpoint of human development,
as the lowest form of moral reasoning.
The second level of moral development is the conventional level, at which
consequences for individual actions are replaced by a more conceptual
understanding of citizenship and acceptable behavior as the sources of moral
identity.8 9 Kohlberg identifies conformity to legal, religious, and social codes
as the foundation of moral reasoning during the conventional stage.90
The highest level of moral maturity occurs at the post-conventional stage.
At this level, values are determined independent of either immediate or
abstract sources of authority.9' Post-conventional morality relies on individ-
ual selection and application of ethical principles in the solution of ethical
problems.Y Post-conventional reasoning is supported by openness to a
diversity of experience rather than strict curtailment under a mold of law
and order.93
Nw. U. L. REv. 693, 693 (1987). While self-actualization is invariably affected by forces that
include the learning prescribed by behavioralists, ethics becomes individualized through the
human potential for responsible, autonomous action within the bounds of unavoidable,
extrinsically imposed limitations.
86. See LAWRENCE KomBEo, I ESSAYS IN MORAL DnmLOP 'mEr: THE PHILOSOPHY OF
MORAL DE LoPmENT (1981); LAWENCE Komnano, 2 ESSAYS N MORAL DEvmLoP~mr: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF MORA DEvELOPMExT (1984).
87. Lawrence Kohlberg, Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education, in
MORAL EDUCATION: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES (C.M. Beck et al. eds., 1971); LAwRENCE
Kom.Bano ET A.., MORAL STAGEs: A CURRENT FORMULATION AND A RESPONSE TO CRITIcs(1983).




92. Id. Kohlberg's post-conventional stage entails the personal affirmation and recognition
of universal principles of justice. While his reference to universality evokes a potentially
extrinsic source of truth, Kohlberg's primary emphasis is on individual development and is
essentially noncoercive.
93. James R. Davis & Ralph E. Welton, Professional Ethics: Business Students' Perceptions,




While primarily a theory of human development, Kohlberg's model in-
corporates the essential elements of fulfillment theories: maturity is a product
of self-actualization and inevitably involves a movement from integration
to differentiation.Y The implication is that maturity entails a shift from
reliance on approval and disapproval of others to reliance on esteem of and
eventually transcendence of the self. This is consistent with Maslow's
conception of self-actualization, in which fulfillment of the need for love
and esteem from others is followed by the hierarchically superior stage of
fulfilling self-esteem needs and, finally, self-actualization. 95
Behavioral and fulfillment models from psychology, together with their
perspectives on the question of morality, differ in an essential way. While
behavioral models are legalistic in their effort to improve the quality of
human behavior through a system of rewards and punishments, fulfillment
models are ultimately nonlegalistic in their progression from low-level con-
formity to authority to a higher level of independent and individual re-
sponsibility and personal assessment. The behavioral model may be laudable
for the improvement of net "good" behavior, however defined,, or despi-
cable from the viewpoint of the freedom and dignity beyond which Skinner
claims to have progressed, depending on the critic's perspective.
Benevolent or evil, applied behavioralism is a system of law, not ethics.
It is a system of law because it reduces decisions to the choice between
compliance and noncompliance with the forces of an external authority.
For this reason it is aptly identified in Kohlberg's scheme as the lowest
form of ethics96 (or more accurately, no ethics at all, but the system of
compulsion necessarily applied to children before they are able to participate
in a meaningful ethical system). In describing the movement away from
authority and toward autonomous reasoning, Kohlberg captures the fun-
damental distinction between legalistic and nonlegalistic conceptions of
ethics: the former are compulsory, or at best manipulative, and the latter
are voluntary and occur within an arena of unrestricted choice.Y
E. Canonization Versus Contingency of Values
Questions of right and wrong and of leading a good life have always
played a central role in both literature and literary theory and analysis.98
94. KOHLBERO ET AL., supra note 87. The concepts of integration and differentiation are
addressed by the psychologist Otto Rank, who defines integration in terms of the social drive
and differentiation in terms of the drive toward independence and the creation of a distinct
character beyond the socially defined identity. For a discussion of Rank's theory, see Orro
RANK, WILL THERAPY AND TRuTH AND REA rry (Jesse Taft trans., 1945).
95. KOHLBERG ET AL., supra note 87; see also Maslow, supra note 82.
96. KOHLBERO ET AL., supra note 87.
97. Id.
98. Literature's concern with virtue and the good life date to Greek drama and philosophic
exposition. See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPtmuc *348, *353, *492, *549, *617-18 (discussing the
relationship between the state and human virtue).
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Legalistic interpretations of literary values are characteristic of proponents
of a canon of superior works. The veneration of an ostensibly incomparable
body of literature tends to effect a dynamic of moral compulsion, either
explicit or latent, particularly during the socializing process of formal
education." Nonlegalistic interpretations regard literary values as ultimately
contingent.1 ° In their ideal form, literary values are noncoercive.
Proponents of a received literary canon'01 of classic and transcendent
proportions contend that eternal truths are contained in the works described
as being timeless. They suggest that a work of classical literature derives its
exalted status from the universal character of the principles and truths
contained therein. °2 Law, like literature, is seen within the canonical per-
spective as containing a core of enduring principles that purportedly capture
the wisdom of the ages.'03
Modern supporters' 04 of the canon'05 generally share two unifying beliefs:
that the classical texts are a crucial vessel for the communication of culture
99. The sociologist Talcot Parsons defines. socialization as the process of internalization of
values. See JONATHAN H. TURNER, TE STRUCTURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 67 (4th ed. 1986).
The socialization that occurs through the recognition of and teaching of a canon is exacerbated
by the insularity of the collection of texts taught. Because the canon is generally construed as
either closed or evolving at a very slow speed, it is naturally conservative of a received and
limited set of values.
100. The concept of "contingency of value" is borrowed from Barbara Herrnstein Smith.
Smith suggests that the value of a text is "radically relative" and therefore "constantly
variable"-in other words, a product of context. BARBARA H. SmnTH, CornoEcIEs oF
VALUE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES FOR CRrTIcAL THEORY 11 (1988).
101. The idea of a literary canon dates at least as far back as ancient Egypt in the third
century B.C., when scholars in the library in Alexandria not only collected and organized
works of literature, but also established standards and guidelines listing the best of those
works. For a discussion of the history of canon development, see George A. Kennedy, Classics
and Canons, in THE PoLITrCS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 223, 225 (Darryl J. Gless & Barbara H.
Smith eds., 1992).
102. Canonical literary perspectives remained relatively uncontested well into the twentieth
century, and informed the critical works of Samuel Johnson, Matthew Arnold, William Hazlett,
and Lionel Trilling.
103. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LrrTRuA: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 20 (1988)
(noting in a passing comment that "[1]awyers, judges, and law professors ... [decide] which
of the hundreds of thousands of reported cases shall be admitted to the canon of 'leading'
cases, the others being largely forgotten").
104. Supporters of the canon have tended to be journalists or academics writing in the
journalistic tradition of the expos6, while the contingency approaches they attack have been
developed within the academic literature. For detailed exposition of the arguments in support
of a canon, see infra notes 106-07. See also DINEsH D'SouzA, IL.IERA. EDUCATION: THE
POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAPus (1991); ROGER Kn IALL, TENURED RADICALS: How
POLITICS HAS CORRUPTED OUR HIGHER EDUCATION (1990); PAGE SmITH, KILLINo TH SPmrr:
HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1990); CHARLES J. SYKES, PROFSCAM: PROFESSORS AND THE
DEMISE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1988).
105. I refer to "the canon" rather than "a canon" to reflect the notion, central to canonical
belief, that a particular collection of texts is inherently and uncontestably superior, nearly to
the point of elevation to mystical status. In this regard, canon-based systems of ethics are
akin to natural law theories which purport to derive their authority from some order higher
than mere human preference or evaluation.
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and its values, 106 and that the decline in respect for the canon is associated
with an erosion of values in society.le 7 Because canonical value systems are
formally transmitted primarily through the process of education, the recent
contest over the canon has occurred in the arena of the academy."'8 Those
who support a version of the canon comprising Western classics believe that
fundamental values have accrued within that canon, subject to the rigorous
critical scrutiny"' 9 of the best minds over an impressive span of time." °
Their belief in the canon often approaches elevation of a collection of
works to the level of the sacred, so that the content therein may be analogous
to some form of natural law within a moral sphere. The exclusivity of the
canon is controversial because of the role it has traditionally played in the
inculcation of classically liberal values. This process is coercive by virtue of
its supporters' insistence that the canon is the one right answer recommended
for universal application."'
The contingency approach to the analysis of texts" 2 presumes that osten-
sibly transcendent, natural, or universal values reflect the social construction
106. See, e.g., E.D. HmscH, JR., CULTURAL LnR.Acy: WHAT EvERY AmEIcAN NEErs To
KNow (1987) (contending that Americans share a national culture, and that a basic fund of
knowledge is necessary for meaningful participation therein).
107. See, e.g., ALLAN BLOOM, Tan CLOSING OF Ta AmEmIcAN MIND: How HIGHER EDU-
CATION HAS FAILiED DEMOCRACY AND IMPovEiusH THE SouLs OF TODAY'S STUimS 313-35
(1987) (suggesting that academic cowardice in the 1960s resulted in both an attack upon the
canon and a related decline in the quality of our moral positions).
108. Probably the most highly publicized battle took place at Stanford University, and
concerned curricular proposals for the modification of the Western Culture requirement. Critics
of the movement to increase multicultural representation in the curriculum believed that
fundamental values of the old Western Culture requirement were being supplanted by special
interest topics related to the political agenda of particular groups. See Richard Bernstein, In
Dispute on Bias, Stanford is Likely to Alter Western Culture Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
1988, at A12.
109. While canonists defend their lists of classics as proven by this scrutiny over time, they
seem to imply that critical analysis in the present is somehow inferior, so that contemporary
scrutiny suggestive of canonical changes is considered unacceptable.
110. See, e.g., Matthew Arnold, The Function of Criticism at the Present Time, in CRIcAL
THEORY SINcE PLATO 588 (Hazel Adams ed., 1971) (stating that literary criticism should
concern itself with knowing "the best that is known and thought in the world").
111. Canon supporters justifiably attack some multiculturalists who also claim to have the
one right answer, and who also would like to teach their answer with such universality as to
approach coercive socialization. While individuals on both the canonical and the contingency
side of values may be susceptible to a human desire, particularly pronounced among professors,
to win converts, the approaches themselves are not equally conducive to coerciveness. Whereas
the insistence of canonists upon the moral superiority of one canon is, if accepted, an
intellectual ground for exclusion of other perspectives and resultant legalistic coercion within
the realm of morality, contingent approaches by definition admit to cultural and other relativity.
While individuals within a noncanonical value system may act coercively, the system respects
a variety of culturally determined perspectives. When individuals communicate conflicting
contingent viewpoints, even with Machiavellian coerciveness, in a system that ultimately accepts
contingency, the resulting variety of perspectives inhibits the development of a universal army
of canonists, all teaching one dogma.
112. The phrase "text" is used here to denote the similarity between law and literature
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of reality."3 Contingency approaches often fall within the rubric of critical
legal studies (if the text is the law) or deconstruction (if the text is literature).
Because critical legal studies and deconstruction both embody the same
spirit of contingency, they are considered together in the discussion that
follows.
Stephen Brainerd depicts rationality in light of contingency-based ap-
proaches, stating:
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) has effectively drawn all forms of discourse
that claim the support of a single, a prioristic "rationality" into an
uncomfortable light-a ight that reveals the pale and confused concept
of reason squirming to crawl back into the well shaded crevasses of
"the way things should be." ' 4
Stated less colorfully, assertions of objective truth or reality are invariably
subjective constructions parading, either in bad faith or in misinformed
good faith, as objectivity.
Contingency approaches to values reject the purported objectivity of the
canon or of any canon as impossible. Interpretive communities, even if they
strain most earnestly toward impartiality in the rational deduction or in-
duction of truth, impart their own biases, cultural presumptions, and
economic and political interests into the process. "' The phenomenon is
exacerbated as self-motivated individuals in positions of power frequently
discard a mandate of good faith in the intellectual rendering of ostensibly
objective truth. The consecration of the canon must be suspect if (a) intended
human impartiality is imperfect,1' 6 or (b) perfect impartiality is subject to
manipulative, selective distortion by those who can and will put forth
conceptions of truth that protect vested rights and interests." 7
Whereas canonical accounts of moral behavior are legalistic in proclaiming
the enforceable righteousness of their own universal application, contingency
relevant to a discussion of how they affect ethical theory. Law and literature are both viewed
from the canonical perspective as normative texts of enduring value in informing us of the
nature of a virtuous life.
113. For a discussion of modem literary criticism within this vein, see REN9 WELUEK &
AusTIN WARREN, THEORY OF LrmwuR (3d ed. 1977).
114. Stephen Brainerd, Note, The Groundless Assault: A Wittgensteinian Look at Language,
Structuralism, and Critical Legal Theory, 34 AM. U. L. R-v. 1231, 1231 (1985).
115. For a discussion of the effects of interpretive communities, see STANLEY FISH, IS THERE
A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 14 (1980).
116. The failure of intended human rationality is likely to result in imperfect intended
impartiality. For a discussion explaining the nature of bounded human rationality, see JAMES
G. M&RcH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 136-71, 203-10 (1958).
117. Stanley Fish observes in this regard that canonical ethicists "are not the ethicists, in
the sense of being the sole proprietors of a moral vision in a world of shameless relativists;
rather, they are the purveyors of a particular moral vision that must make its way in the face
of competition from other moral visions that come attached to texts no less inherently worthy
than [others]." Stanley Fish, The Common Touch, Or, One Size Fits All, in THE Po,.rncs OF
LIBERAL EDUCATION, supra note 101, at 241, 254 (emphasis in original).
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approaches are regarded by canonists as dangerous and lawless not only in
their failure to take a stand, but, more to the point, in their failure to take
the stand.
Critical legal studies has been discussed in terms of "guerilla warfare," 8
and deconstruction of literary texts is viewed by detractors as essentially
nihilistic." 9 Yet the refusal to accept one perfect embodiment of truth should
not be confused with lawlessness, but rather recognized as the acknowl-
edgement that law and ethics operate in fundamentally different, if some-
times overlapping, realms. Ethics can be nonlegalistic without being either
lawless or nihilistic, if one recognizes the different conditions under which
law and ethics operate. While laws may bring the unwelcome authoritative
enforcement of particular behaviors upon a protesting participant of society,
ethics is at heart antithetic to the ideas of force and enforcement. The
notion of one fixed canon cannot be derived in a vacuum, however eager
its proponents are to imply its sanctity to the point of suggesting its
immaculate conception. So long as human beings with human interests and
human weaknesses champion the cause of one canon, the implication of
human ethical coercion is inescapable. Ironically, supporters of a Euro-
American canon, who often claim individual liberty and freedom among its
most inviolable values, defend the authoritarian inculcation of morals ele-
vated beyond the reach of an open marketplace of ideas. 20
F. Legal Positivism Versus Legal Realism
Two central currents in jurisprudence-legal positivism and legal realism-
have long occupied opposing ground regarding the relationship between
normative philosophy and the law.' 2 ' Positivist perspectives regard the law
as a mechanism of rule that is largely self-justifying by virtue of the power
118. See Guyana Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as Guerrilla Warfare, 76 GEo. L.J. 1
(1987).
119. See, e.g., Charles L. Griswold, Deconstruction, the Nazis and Paul de Man, N.Y.
Rav. BooKs, Oct. 12, 1989, at 69 (stating that deconstruction "renders theoretically unintel-
ligible basic moral terms such as good and evil").
120. Thus Gerald Graff's edict, "Teach the Conflicts," suggests that the truest means of
allowing students to assess arguments for and against a canon is to expose them to all sides
of the debate. See Gerald Graff, Teach the Conflicts, in Tim PoLrncs oF LMERAL EDUCATION,
supra note 101, at 57. Graff's philosophy comprises a good faith effort to implement the
ideals of a free marketplace of ideas under controversial conditions. Proponents of the canon,
virtually always theoretical defenders of the classical concepts of free markets and free speech,
ironically recommend the severe limitation of discourse through the tight binding of an accepted
canon of textual material to be examined.
121. For a detailed discussion of these two perspectives, see Steven R. Salbu, Differentiated
Perspectives on Insider Trading, 66 ST. JoHN's L. Ray. 373 (1992).
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behind it.' = Realist viewpoints are more analytical and critical, and focus
on understanding the political and economic interests that can become
ingredients in the creation and development of laws."'
For the purposes of this Article, the essential distinction between positivist
and realist paradigms consists of the critical or analytical position taken by
each. For the positivist, command, authority, and rule are the components
of law. 124 This pragmatic emphasis creates a nonanalytical, noncritical
mindset that is legalistic in stressing the compulsory nature of jurisprudence.
For the realist, command and authority should be continually and critically
evaluated, to understand the sources and biases of the rules that govern us.
It is nonlegalistic in its emphasis on the nature and derivation of laws rather
than on the edict of laws.1 5
Differences between positivist and realist assessments of law affect the
way one understands ethical processes. In Part I, I argued that there are
no real codes of ethics. One knows that sets of rules exist that are both
labelled and widely accepted as ethical codes. However, observations in Part
I lead to the conclusion that such codes, like all codes, are of law and not
of ethics. Positivist and realist approaches to understanding codes can help
illuminate important differences between these two positions.'7
122. The positivist conception affirms the legitimacy of law beyond the realm of ethical
justification. The positivist separates the spheres of law and ethics by insisting that the former
can exist independently of the latter. This bifurcation of law and ethics is not identical to the
separation that I am recommending in this Article. Whereas my contention is that ethics should
be envisioned as transcending mere force of code or compromise via contract, the positivists
contend the reverse-that law transcends the individualized rendering of ethical conclusions.
While these viewpoints are potentially at odds with each other, they address separate questions:
the effect laws should have on defining ethics, and the effects ethics should have on defining
and complying with laws.
123. See Salbu, supra note 121. Salbu observes that:
Where the positivist perceives the law to be a given according to an extant
command or rule, the realist examines actual relationships and behavior to
determine the underlying structural and systemic dynamics, which are not pre-
sumed to be value neutral. The critical matrix that such examination places over
the unquestioning positivism it seeks to supplant entails both the scrutiny of the
laws themselves and the examination of the courts and their participants.
Id. at 379.
124. Lon Fuller has described the positivist position as treating the law as "a manifested
fact of social authority or power, to be studied for what it is and does, and not for what it
is trying to do or become." LON FuuLER, THE MoRALr OF LAw 145 (rev. ed. 1969).
125. Positivist conceptions are generally compatible with natural law and canonical view-
points, whereas realist approaches are consistent with the analytical character of relativist and
critical viewpoints. Where the positivists settle upon one received set of inviolable values,
realism entails the continuous process of reassessment of assumptions, manifest and latent
dynamics, and resulting effects.
126. What follows are not the renderings of existing positivist and realist assessments of
codes of ethics. Rather, they are my own renditions of the ways in which one might typically
evaluate codes of ethics from each paradigm, conveyed to the reader for purposes of illustration.
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For the positivist, any code of law127 is understood in terms of command
and legitimacy of command. Laws created by the empowered sovereign
derive their validity from the very nature of the idea of sovereignty.' 28
Applied to the codification of ethics, canons for professionals have the
force of compulsion because practitioners voluntarily submit themselves to
the force of rule within the profession. Likewise, the positivist would limit
assessment of a corporate code of ethics to questions of legitimacy of the
governance structure: provided that all members of the organization partic-
ipate therein under mutually accepted contract, the bureaucratic hierarchy
is the legitimate source of internal sovereignty. The codes of ethics formu-
lated within professions and organizations are, like any codes of law, an
amalgamation of norms made formal by a valid source of command. 29
A realist would evaluate any legalistic formulation of ethics critically,
going beneath the surface or the appearance of the law's intentions and
effects, seeking to identify latent dynamics in the formulation of the code. 30
Inherent in this approach is an essential departure from the positivist view-
for the realist, the virtue of law is not presumed to follow from the
legitimacy of the source of law. The realist recognizes the motives and
opportunities available to persons in power to establish self-serving laws,
laws that resist change and maintain the existing order. Politically motivated,
these laws may be viewed by those engaged in critical analysis as morally
bad laws.13"' If one starts from the position that areas of ethical controversy
exist, and that those who create professional or organizational policy may
have an interest in the manner in which such controversy may reach ultimate
resolution, one must conclude that definitive renderings of the particular
shape and structure of ethics are vulnerable to corruption. The realist
recognizes the motives and opportunities for the coercive process to taint
the ethical character of substantive laws.
The positivist accepts a legalistic conception of ethics, along with the
inevitable establishment of norms, rules, and standards by legitimate sources
of authority. Yet, once legislated, the ethics that result are so unquestioned
as to be indistinguishable from value-free laws that comprise pure policy. 32
127. This includes those codes that are labelled codes of ethics but that nonetheless comprise
codes of law because their contents are mandatory rather than precatory.
128. See generally JoHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1861).
129. For a discussion of the relationship between the legal positivist paradigm and the
separation of morality and the law, see H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 615-21 (1958).
130. For a classic discussion of the ways in which the realist views the law, see O.W.
Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARv. L. RaV. 457 (1897) (favoring critical analysis which
breaks down unquestioning compliance with the law by attempting to demystify it).
131. In this vein, realism and concepts of deconstruction, as discussed infra Part III, are
closely related. Legal codes and their judicial interpretation, are easily enlisted as partisan tools
for gaining resources or power, given the indeterminacy of language.
132. "Pure policy" is an ideal type. It refers to an approach to the limit at which decisions




Rules requiring physicians to divulge exceptional types of otherwise confi-
dential information133 are no different under this scheme than rules that
require driving on the right rather than the left side of the road.
The realist is more likely to recognize pernicious effects of the process
of coercion. From a realist perspective, the force of law is always in
question. Because there can be no presumed objectivity of edict, there can
be no relinquishment of corruption when controversial issues of morality
are converted into laws. Legalistic forms of ethics demand conformity to
authoritative standards in hard cases, those cases in which the relinquishment
of autonomous decision making is most painful. To make matters worse,
the process by which the standards are developed is vulnerable to the
intervention of authoritative self-interest. Under realist assumptions, legis-
lated codes of ethics 3 4 are flawed in two ways: (1) they force controversial
moral stances upon those who contest the validity of those stances, and (2)
they formulate moral policy under conditions in which it is possible and
likely that good faith will sometimes be abdicated in furtherance of self-
interest.
III. CONFORMITY, CONSENSUS, AND CONFLICT: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE APPROPRIATE SPHERE FOR
ETHICAL ANALYSIS
In Part II, I compared six dualities, examining the ways in which scholars
conceptualize ethics from different disciplinary bases. In each instance, the
extreme idealized types comprise a conformity-oriented view 3 and a conflict-
oriented view 36 of the fundamental nature of ethics, as designated below:
Conformity-Oriented View Conflict-Oriented View
Natural Law Relativism
Classical Approaches Neoclassical Approaches
Deism Existentialism
Behavioral Models Fulfillment Models
Canonization Contingency of Value
Legal Positivism Legal Realism
133. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
134. Here, as throughout this analysis, my concept of ethical spheres is limited to those I
consider controversial. Realists are less concerned with codification of universally accepted
norms than with codification of moral viewpoints regarding which reasonable minds may
differ.
135.. The term "conformity-oriented views" means ethical paradigms that attempt to increase
compliance with a received and undisputed set of ethical standards.
136. The term "conflict-oriented views" means those paradigms that recognize the possibility
of rational divergence in the valuation of moral alternatives, and encourage discourse high-




Conformity-oriented models share several characteristics: they acknowl-
edge the existence of an objectively superior choice within the context of
an ethical decision, they assume the existence of a human capacity to
understand the nature of the superiority and inferiority of ethical choices,
and they welcome as part of the implementation of moral behavior the
legislation of compliance through the use of rules or norms associated with
the rewards and punishments necessary to the execution of law.
Conflict-oriented models can be compared to conformity-oriented models
by responding, point by point, to the assumptions contained in the latter.
A conflict-oriented model questions the soundness of ethics-via-conformity
by concluding that any or all of these assumptions are false. The model
may decline to recognize the existence of an objectively superior choice, or
it may deny the human capability to ascertain any intrinsic superiority, or
it may disavow the ethical nature of enforcing controversial positions
through legal or legalistic 37 coercion.
Throughout the discussions of each dichotomy in Part II, I have addressed
the particular manner in which each of the couplets can be characterized
as essentially conformity-oriented or conflict-oriented, and have suggested
that the latter conception is truer to the sensb of what ethics should entail
than is the former. What remains is to examine why this is so.
To evaluate the merits of conformity and conflict in the realm of ethics,
one must focus on what is the essence of moral reasoning. Ethics can be
defined in terms of what is "good" or "right," concepts that can further
be refined in the nuances of definition. For Aristotle, the good was a
function of the realization or achievement of one's function in the world.'
A good person in the Aristotelian sense is a good mother, or banker, or
teacher, or doctor, if one defines good as effective. Aristotle also spoke of
virtues, a set of attributes characteristic of the good-courage, temperance,
liberality, magnificence, pride, good temper, friendliness, truthfulness, wit-
tiness, shame, and justice.3 9 Because these virtues are uncontroversial, and
because Aristotle did not suggest which virtues applied when virtues were
in conflict, Aristotelian ethics are of limited value when applied to hard
ethical situations.
137. Legal coercion refers to compulsion under the laws of the state; legalistic coercion
refers to informal means of pressuring conformity through the application of rewards and
punishments which operate to compel a particular action in a manner analogous to the
enforcement of law. Behavioraism, for example, is viewed here as legalistic because the
application of rewards and punishments extrinsically models behavior in the same way that
threat of negative legal sanctions and promise of positive ones exacts compliance under actual
laws.
138. ARISTOTL, THE ETmcs oF ARISTOTLE 47 (J.A.K. Thompson trans., 1953). Aristotle's
rendering of the good life suggests that because all things have a purpose, the good is furthered
by striving for excellence in the achievement of one's functions in life.
139. For Aristotle, virtues are attributes, the attainment of which supports one's excellence
in functioning for the good of society. See id. at 52-60.
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Conformity-oriented models of ethics arise from Aristotle's variety of
thinking, and are defined in terms of role fulfillment. To be good or to do
right is to behave in a manner prescribed. The notion of a role necessitates
an element of prescription, and the idea of prescription can only exist as a
function of some source. While roles that are internalized can be viewed as
self-prescribed, 140 the norms which underlie prescriptive roles are fundamen-
tally social constructs. 41 The conception of ethics based on role fulfillment
is an impoverished and inferior one for several reasons. Most crucially,
role-driven ethics negates the possibility and advantage of evaluating the
underlying roles sets 42 themselves. For example, a good lawyer is one who
practices the received art and science of law effectively. The execution is
the key, leaving the deeper question unanswered-namely, whether the
activities of an effective lawyer are good ones or bad ones. In other words,
role-effectiveness models of ethics provide no mechanism for truly evaluating
the basic activities that occur within a society.
In the context of defining ethics, consensus in the form of a social
contract can be viewed as the evolutionary link between Aristotelian role-
conceptions and modem indeterminate models. Because the rigidity of static
role-compliance renderings of ethics denies the option of continuous eval-
uation of premises underlying the roles, consensus developed as a means of
fashioning changes in the rules that form the basis of role compliance. 43
Contract, as a means of infusing the opportunity to engage in consensual
adjustment of roles, arose because the evaluative process of ever adjusting
our sense of good and right behavior is absolutely fundamental to ethics.
Conformity to expectations can never comprise the whole of human ethics
precisely because this drive to evaluate is so crucial a component of the
ethical process. Legalistic exaction of compliance occurs all the time, and
is central to the very nature of law. Legalistic models of ethics, however,
defy so basically the elective nature and evaluatory function of morality as
to be disqualified from the realm.
The development of contractual mechanisms for consensus is a bridge
that leads directly to the conceptions of virtue from which conflict-oriented
systems of ethics derive their power. As humans move from goodness-as-
obedience to goodness-negotiated-under-contract, we notice the landscape
beyond, in which goodness is defined independently through processes of
individual synthesis, analysis, and assessment of the merits of arguments
arising from human discourse. Where conformity-oriented ethics are ethics
by monologue, consensus-oriented ethics are derived from a dialogue, and
140. See DANin KArz & ROBERT L. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS,
185-222 (2d ed. 1978).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 189.
143. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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conflict-oriented ethics are products of all possible strands of human con-
versation. Expectations of conformity as a source of ethics thereby yield
the most restrictive and dehumanizing versions of morality, whereas expec-
tations of conflict and debate create the most enabling and empowering
renditions. The trouble with law-based conceptions of ethics is their con-
striction relative to the basic evaluative potential of human beings in a free
society.
CONCLUSION
Our attempts to establish definitive codes or principles of ethics are
usually made in good faith, yet they are misguided for three reasons. First,
they are premised upon a conception of ethics that is ultimately reduced to
some variety of behavior or compliance. This is a low conception of ethics
compared to its alternative, the expectation of continuous individual thought,
analysis, and deliberation.'" It is likewise a dangerous conception of ethics.
The replacement of personal authorship with centralized social authorship
establishes ethical validation through authority and increases the potential
occurrence of mindless behavior. 45 Thus, Reinhold Niebuhr observes the
potential within social forms of morality for massive acts of atrocity.'"
Second, codified versions of ethics, such as professional and corporate
codes, inadvertently suggest that because the code has considered the im-
portant moral questions, compliance with the code is a sufficient fulfillment
of ethical consideration. So-called codes of ethics that actually comprise the
rules or laws of a profession or an organization can thereby come to replace
any impetus to consider the ethical issues that would otherwise arise outside
their limited purview. The misnomer of labelling law as ethics thereby
degrades and devalues the importance and expectation of carefully consid-
ering what are often difficult and daunting questions. The codification
intended to establish minimum requirements of performance can instead
create a de facto maximum as participants in the system equate ethical
action and compliance with a very basic code of rules. 47
144. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
145. Thus, Hannah Arendt describes the atrocities of Nazi Germany in terms of the
oppressive control of totalitarian ethics. HANNAH ARENDT, EicmHANN IN JExusALm: A REPORT
ON THE BANA=nT OF EvIL (rev. & enlarged ed. 1963).
146. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMORA. SociETY 117 (1932).
147. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). The situation in which
compliance with the law is equated with fulfillment of ethical obligations is consistent with
Milton Friedman's philosophy that business's social obligation is profit maximization. That
argument suggests that once a business organization assures itself that it is following the basic
rules of the game, its ethical obligation is to maximize the wealth of its shareholders. While
functioning in this way might fulfill Aristotle's ethical ideal of best fulfilling one's social role,
it forecloses consideration of right and wrong, equating legal compliance with moral fortitude.
When one witnesses egregious business practices that occur within the law, one can evaluate
the degree to which law-based conceptions of ethics are either functional or dysfunctional.
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Third, the equation of compliance with legalistic ethical catalogues is
incompatible with the highest order of human dignity and potential. This
observation is predicated on assumptions that human dignity is most com-
patible with maximization of freedom, and that human potential is best
exercised under conditions that recognize and permit the employment of
free will and self-determination. While public discourse regarding the merits
of different approaches is indispensable, the standardization of appropriate
ethical answers and attempts to indoctrinate those answers are most appro-
priate when they do not infringe on controversial ethical issues.
Where reasonable minds can differ, they should be permitted to do so.
Where reasonable minds would agree, we should establish laws and call
them laws to effectuate the collective reason. We should remember that
they are laws and recognize them as such. In doing so, we leave true ethical
issues inviolate, the realm of responsible and ultimately individual analysis
and decision.

